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Fixed Instruments to Cope with Stock Externalities
An Experimental Evaluation
Summary
We evaluate the effectiveness of non optimal and temporally inconsistent incentive
policies for regulating the exploitation of a renewable common-pool resource. The
corresponding game is an N-person discrete-time deterministic dynamic game of T
periods fixed duration. Three policy instruments with parameters that remain constant
for the whole horizon are evaluated: a pigouvian tax (flat tax), an ambient tax (ambient
flat tax) and an instrument combining the two previous ones (mixed flat instrument). We
test in the lab the predictions of the model solved for 3 distinct behavioural
assumptions: (a) sub-game perfection, (b) myopic behaviour, and (c) joint payoff
maximization. We find that subjects behave myopically in the unregulated situation,
which agrees with previous results in the literature. Conditional on predictions, the
mixed flat instrument and the flat tax are the most effective policies in approaching the
optimum extraction path. However, in absolute terms the ambient flat tax and the mixed
flat instrument curb most significantly the mean extraction path towards the optimum
path. Paradoxically, these instruments are the less efficient ones.
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1. Introduction
Managing the exploitation of renewable natural resources, designing policies aimed at
reducing water or air pollution, or fighting against global warming, requires taking into
account stock externalities. Unlike static externalities whose detrimental effects disappear
after some time, stock externalities generate persistent effects due to the accumulation
process. Examples include greenhouse gases emissions, groundwater withdrawals, fisheries
exploitation, etc.... In contrast to static externalities, which may be remedied by policies
correcting inefficient decisions, for stock externalities no instant policy is capable to
remediate immediately the damage created in previous periods. Once the resource stock has
been deteriorated current policies can only curb the dynamic externalities beyond the current
period. Empirical and experimental findings showed that in a dynamic environment, resource
exploitation can lead to dramatic inefficiencies, enhancing the need for effective policies to
cope with them (Clark, 1974; Herr et al, 1997; Giordana, 2007). In this paper, we analyze
policy instruments targeted to achieve a second-best withdrawal path in the case of a
common-pool renewable resource.
The literature on externalities puts traditionally forward Pigouvian taxes as a particularly
adapted policy for correcting externalities (Baumol and Oates, 1988), although unit taxes are
inefficient when the regulator cannot observe individual actions. Observability of individual
actions rests on the availability of monitoring technologies and/or negligible observational
costs (Millock et al, 2002). If such technology is available, unit taxes can be enforced by the
regulator through incentive mechanisms such as random auditing combined to penalties in
case of detected shirking (Becker, 1968; Polinsky and Shavell, 1979; Kritikos, 2004). If
monitoring technologies are not available, or observational costs are prohibitive, in most
instances the regulator can nevertheless periodically observe the state of the resource.
Instruments developed initially to cope with nonpoint-source pollution can be implemented
efficiently in these cases (e.g. the ambient tax).
In a dynamic framework with a finite horizon, policy parameters can be adjusted from one
period to the next to adapt incentives to the observed state of the resource and to the
remaining time. Efficient internalization of a dynamic externality can therefore be achieved
by adjusting the tax rate, the penalty, and the targets after each period (Xepapadeas, 1991;
Xepapadeas, 1992; Xepapadeas, 1994). From a practical point of view, the implementation of
such a dynamic policy instrument is generally not feasible; the regulator’s policy choice set is
therefore constrained. We consider two types of constraints on the regulator’s choice:
technical constraints and ethical constraints. Technical constraints on policy instruments are
due to behavioural heterogeneity, lack of relevant information or transaction costs for
adjusting targets and instruments. We assume that these constraints restrict the regulator’s
choice set to ‘fixed’ - non optimal - instruments (Ko et al, 1992). In contrast to optimal
instruments, fixed instruments are characterized by constant policy parameters all along the
temporal horizon. Nevertheless, even with fixed instruments the first best withdrawal
trajectory can be achieved. Ethical constraints however put more stringent restrictions on the
policy choice set. Take the example of the ambient tax and assume that all agents do not
behave rationally. Whenever total withdrawals are off the target trajectory, all agents are
liable to pay a fine even if they did not free ride. Such instruments might therefore be
politically or ethically unacceptable with the implication that the first best withdrawal path
can no longer be achieved. In this paper, we assume that the regulator is might be constrained
to implement instruments that achieve only a second best extraction path. We consider
therefore two types of fixed instruments in this paper: first best fixed instruments when only
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technical constraints restrict the regulator’s choice set and second best fixed instruments when
also ethical constraints apply.
We provide an experimental evaluation of alternative policies to cope with the dynamic
externalities generated by the exploitation of a renewable common-pool resource. The reason
why we chose to rely on an experimental approach is that most of these instruments have not
yet been implemented in the field. Our paper relates to the work of Herr et al (1997) which
compares the efficiency of the exploitation of a non-renewable common-pool resource that
generates either only static externalities or both dynamic and static externalities. Their results
witness for the increased inefficiency of the resource exploitation when a dynamic framework
is considered. We implement a similar experimental protocol and introduce three extensions
to their work: (i) the common-pool resource is renewable, (ii) we consider only dynamic
externalities, and (iii) we evaluate policy instruments to correct the inefficiencies. The two
first extensions rely on empirical considerations. Actually, many common-pool resources are
renewable (e.g. fisheries, forests, aquifers) and depending on some intrinsic characteristics
their exploitation may or not generate intra-period external costs. We compare three
alternative non optimal instruments: (i) a fixed tax rate on declared extractions combined with
a compliance monitoring mechanism (flat tax); (ii) the ambient tax based on Segerson (1988)
with fixed tax rates and fixed targets (ambient tax); and (iii) a mixed instrument combining
the two previous instruments based on Kritikos (2004), (mixed flat instrument). We consider
three kinds of benchmark behavior -myopic, rational and optimum- and discuss the
corresponding symmetric solutions of the dynamic game, respectively, the per-period Nash
equilibrium outcome, the sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome, and the joint profit
maximizing outcome. Under myopic behaviour the optimization horizon is restricted to one
period; withdrawers do not consider the impact of their actual extractions on their own future
profits. The myopic player assumes that all other players behave myopically, and therefore a
Nash equilibrium is calculated for each period. Under rational behaviour, farsighted selfish
withdrawers internalize the impact of their current extraction decision but just on their own
future returns. Sub-game perfection is the solution concept applied to this game. The optimum
outcome consists in the decision that maximizes the sum of all withdrawers’ profit for the
whole temporal horizon. On the optimum extraction path, no externalities are generated.
However, in this kind of social dilemmas this strategy is dominated.
We summarize our main findings as follows. Subjects behave myopically in the unregulated
situation, which agrees with previous results in the literature. Conditional on predictions, the
mixed flat instrument and the flat tax are the most effective policies in approaching the
optimum extraction path. However, in absolute terms the ambient flat tax and the mixed flat
instrument curb most significantly the mean extraction path towards the optimum path.
Paradoxically, these instruments are the less efficient ones. In our dynamic game stock saving
implies forgone earnings that must be “cashed” in future periods by extracting the optimal
quantities, otherwise losses become significant. This suggests that care must be paid in the
practical implementation of time inconsistent instruments, since early deviations from
predictions alter the incentives set by each policy, either encouraging non optimal behaviour
or just confusing subjects with distorted signals.
Section 2 introduces the dynamic exploitation game of a renewable common pool resource.
The predicted path for each behavioural assumption is derived and the corresponding policy
instruments are discussed. Section 3 introduces the experimental design and the predicted
paths obtained with our parametric choice. Section 4 exposes the results: firstly, the fitting of

3
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper133

4

Giordana and Willinger: Fixed Instruments to Cope with Stock Externalities An Experi

the data to the theoretical predictions, and secondly the efficiency and effectiveness of each
policy instrument. Section 5 concludes.

2. A Discrete Dynamic Game of Common Pool Resources’ Exploitation
Our experiment is based on a discrete finite time dynamic game of CPR exploitation. We first
introduce the model before discussing possible solutions depending on alternative behavioural
assumptions.
Assume that N identical appropriators, indexed by i, extract units from a common resource in
each period, t = 1,…,T. The resource is characterized at each period t, by a stock of available
units. In period t appropriator i withdraws the quantity yit . The evolution of the resource stock
is described by equation (1):

S t +1 = S t − Y t + r

(1)

where, S t is the stock of available units of the resource in the beginning of period t, r is the
natural per period recharge1, and Y t = ∑ yit is the total extraction in period t.
∀i

According to Equation (1), the groundwater stock grows naturally2 with the recharge and
decrease with extractions.
Extracted units generate a gross return to appropriator i in period t, given by:

( )

( )

ui yit = a ⋅ yit − b ⋅ yit

2

(2)

where a, b > 0 .
The average extraction cost from the CPR depends linearly on the available stock and on total
extractions of the period:

AC ( S t , Y t ) = p + z ⋅ Y t − f ⋅ S t

(3)

where p , z , f ≥ 0 . z measures the within period externality, and f measures the across period
externality3. Since there is free access to the resource, the period t profit of each appropriator
(we drop the index i) is given by:

( ) ( )

U y t = u y t − AC t ⋅ y t

(4)

1

Note that we assume a constant recharge in our model.
If there were no extractions the resource stock would grow indefinitely. A more complete specification of the
resource dynamics should define a natural out-flow or disease rate.
3
In many empirical situations only across-period externalities are present. For example, in the case of
groundwater exploitation there is no reason to think that pumping on the same basin by two individuals remotely
located, will mutually affect each other’s net return within a period (Brozovic, 2006).
2
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We assume that appropriator i’s objective function in each period t is to maximize the
T

discounted sum of his profits,

∑ρ
s =t

s −t
i

⋅ U s . Let Wi t be appropriator i’s accumulated wealth in

period t:
t

Wi t = W 0 + ∑U is

∀i ,

(5)

s =1

where Wi 0 is appropriator i’s initial wealth. Appropriators may have different discount rates.
Since we have no financial markets in the model, the interpretation is that appropriators’
preferences for the present are heterogeneous. For sake of simplicity we allow ρ i to take just

two values in the set Ρ = {0,1}, which is assumed to be common knowledge. We call “myopic”,
appropriators who totally discount future benefits, and “rational”, appropriators who do not
discount the future. Behaviourally speaking rational appropriators are farsighted, i.e. they
internalize the impact of their current extractions on their own future profits. In contrast,
myopic appropriators just care about their current profit neglecting any future impact of
current extractions.

2.1 Laissez faire
In a situation with no public intervention we derive different benchmark solutions for the
extraction game. We consider three kinds of behaviour, which correspond to three symmetric
solutions of the game4: the sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome (farsighted appropriators),
the myopic outcome (myopic appropriators), and the joint profit maximization outcome
(cooperators). Let us call these benchmark solutions the Rational, Myopic and Optimum
outcome, respectively.
Rational appropriators internalize the impact of their current extractions on their own future
profits. They define an optimal extraction plan, which is a best response to the other players’
optimal extraction plans. This extraction plan is called feedback strategy if it is a function of
the available stock in each period t. Such a solution needs a particular information structure;
appropriators must perfectly observe the available stock of the resource at the beginning of
each period (Basar and Olsder, 1999), which allows them to adapt their extraction plan to
every period’s conditions5. Conversely, if appropriators do not observe in every period the
available stock, but just the initial stock at the beginning of the game, they will not be able to
periodically adapt their extraction plan. In that case, rational appropriators implement an
open-loop strategy (Basar and Olsder, 1999)6.
Under the assumption of myopic behaviour, the optimization horizon is restricted to one
period. Each period the myopic appropriator calculates the profit maximizing extraction given
the best responses of his rivals. In each period of the game, except the last one, myopic
behaviour leads to higher extractions compared to rational behaviour, given the resource stock
available in period t. Rational appropriators are able to take into account in their actual
4

Every appropriator in the population has the same time preferences and no preference reversals are allowed.
There is no commitment on extraction decisions (see Levhari, D. and L. J. Mirman (1980), Levhari, D., R.
Michener, et al. (1981), Reinganum, J. and N. Stokey (1985) as examples of such strategies applied to modeling
the fisheries exploitation).
6
Hence, there is full commitment to a fixed extraction path.
5
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decision the future periods’ natural recharge of the available stock. The larger the natural
recharge the greater is the gap between rational and myopic extractions trajectories.
The optimum outcome is derived by maximizing the aggregate profit of all appropriators’
over the temporal horizon. The corresponding trajectory would be obtained by a benevolent
regulator or by perfect cooperation of the appropriators, which both imply joint profit
maximization. The optimum extraction path has a positive slope which is vanishing in the
case where the natural recharge is null.
The extraction game involves a social dilemma, since the cooperative outcome is a dominated
strategy. We therefore investigate various policy instruments that could be implemented by a
regulator whose objective is to match the private incentives with the public objective.

2.2 Regulation
We consider a regulator who has the option to set financial incentives in order to implement
the cooperative outcome as the equilibrium strategy of the game. We assume that the
regulator can choose among three alternative first best instruments: (i) a tax on declared
extractions with a compliance monitoring mechanism; (ii) an ambient tax; and (iii) a mixed
instrument combining the two previous instruments.
The optimal tax scheme requires two properties: zero fraud and internalization of the
appropriation externalities (static and dynamic). The optimal individual tax
rate τ it* S t , Y t , r , yit , ρ i depends on the available stock, the total extraction, the recharge, the
individual extraction and the discount rate. The resource stock and the natural recharge
increase the optimal tax rate as enhance the dynamic externality. On the contrary, total
extractions reduce the optimal tax rate because they shrink the dynamic externality by
degrading future periods’ resource stocks. Individual extractions have two conflicting effects
on the tax rate. On one hand, the tax rate increases with individual extractions to internalize
the associated static externality; on the other hand, the tax rate diminishes as individual
extractions reduce the dynamic externality in the same way than the total extractions do.
Concerning the discount rate, myopic appropriators face a higher tax rate than farsighted
appropriators, for any resource stock and period (excepting the ending one).

(

)

In order to monitor compliance the regulator can audit a fixed number of appropriators in each
period. We assume perfect audit: spot controls allow the regulator to observe the exact
individual level of current extraction. Detected cheaters must pay a fixed penalty in addition
to their tax debt. As appropriators do not know who has been audited in the period, all
appropriators face the same audit probability. A risk neutral agent will avoid cheating if the
penalty is equal to:

(

)

(

)

U S t , yit − p ⋅ τ it ⋅ yit − yˆ it − yˆ it ⋅τ it
Ω =
,
p
t
i

(6)

where, p is the audit probability, ŷit is the ith appropriator declared extraction. The lower the
audit probability the higher the penalty required to encourage compliance. However, if limited
liability constraints prevent high penalties to be enforced, first best solution may not be
achievable.

6
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In some cases appropriators can successfully hide extractions, avoiding penalties after a
control. In such cases tax schemes are inefficient, and an instrument based on total extraction,
if observable, might be indicated. Following Segerson (1988) a first best extraction path can
be attained by implementing in each period an unbalanced collective penalty of the form:



Γit = κ it × max  S t + ∑ yit − S t* ,0
∀i



t = 1,...,T .

(7)

Where S t* is the first best resource stock at the end of period t. With this instrument every
appropriator pays for the extractions in excess of the target. An ambient tax rate
κ it = τ it* S t , Y t , r , ρ i introduces optimal incentives to first best extractions, implying that none
of the appropriators is penalized at equilibrium. However, the ambient tax has many
drawbacks (Kritikos, 2004). In order to avoid tax payments some appropriators may
compensate excessive extractions of free riders resulting in multiplicity of equilibria. If
coordination fails, innocent appropriators will be wrongly punished. Additionally, if penalties
are high enough, limited liability constraints will prevent the ambient tax to be enforced on
some appropriators and the first best solution will not be achieved.

(

)

The mixed instrument results from the combination of the previously described policies
(Kritikos 2004). Under this policy, appropriators pay taxes on declared extractions and a
collective penalty is levied if total declared extractions differ from the total extraction
observed by the regulator. Furthermore, the regulator performs random in situ controls to
track for cheating appropriators who must pay their tax debt and the collective penalty while
the compliant appropriators are freed of paying the collective penalty.
The mixed instrument achieves the first best extraction path as a unique equilibrium, avoiding
the limited liability constraints, whenever the collective penalty takes the following form
(Kritikos 2004):
Γit = τ it* × min Wi t , ∑ yit − ∑ ŷit 


∀i
∀i

(8)

2.2.1 Policy choice
The practical implementation of any of the previously described instruments is costly;
designing individual tax rates and adjusting them each period, identification of the
appropriators’ type, compliance monitoring and observation of relevant variables are costly
activities. In practice the regulator has a limited budget to achieve the first best solution.
Additionally, the regulator might be restricted in the policy choice by legal and political
considerations. Furthermore, instruments might be adapted to ensure in each period a
minimum profit to appropriators.
Let us suppose that the regulator cannot afford the identification of the appropriators’ types
nor the adjustment of the instruments’ parameters from one period to another. The
instruments are therefore implemented with uniform and fixed parameters, i.e. the tax rate
would be the same for every appropriator’s type and won’t be adjusted over time. It can be
shown that under certain conditions the previously described instruments, with uniform and
fixed parameters, can successfully implement the first best extraction path (Giordana 2007).
7
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2.2.2 Transformed policy instruments
(i)

Flat tax

We call flat tax a policy instrument resulting from the combination of a tax scheme (described
in section 2.2) with a uniform and a fixed tax rate, and a subsidy equal to the tax payments if
extractions are less than the first best extractions. Under the flat tax appropriators will pay a
uniform tax on declared extractions:

τ if

τ it = 
0 if


yit > y t*
∀i, t

(9)

yit ≤ y t*

where, y t* is the period t first best extraction resulting from an open-loop strategy.
If τ is sufficiently high and there is total compliance, the flat tax can achieve the first best
solution and no tax is levied in that case. Compliance is monitored in the same way described
for the tax scheme (section 2.2).

(ii)

Ambient flat tax

We call ambient flat tax the ambient tax defined by equation (7) but with a uniform and a
fixed tax rate κ :


Γit = κ × max  S t + ∑ yit − S t* ,0 t = 1,...,T .
∀i



(10)

Similarly to the flat tax, the ambient flat tax can achieve the first best solution if κ is
sufficiently high.

(iii)

Mixed flat instrument

This instrument is similar to the mixed instrument described in section 2.2, but the tax rate is
replaced by equation (9). Then, the mixed flat instrument is a first best policy if τ is
sufficiently high.

Under any of these transformed policy instruments the first best solution is attainable if the
tax rates are correctly calibrated. Additionally, no tax is levied at equilibrium. Thus, myopic
and farsighted appropriators will remain on the optimal extraction path (the optimum
outcome). However, if the regulator is constrained to fix a tax rate smaller than the optimal
one (as a consequence of political considerations), the optimum extraction path will be a
dominated strategy. Then, under any of the flat instruments, each appropriator type (myopic
and farsighted) will have different optimal feedbacks.

8
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3. Experimental Design
The experimental protocol was designed to capture the fundamental aspects of the game
described by equations (1)-(5). In each period, subjects decide the amount of “units” to extract
from an account. Given the parameterization (see Table 1), in each period a subject earns
experimental points depending on his/her unit order and on the available units in the account
at the beginning of that period. We run 4 treatments: “Laissez-faire” (LF hereafter), which
corresponds to the benchmark treatment without any policy instrument, the Flat Tax treatment
(FT hereafter), the Ambient Flat Tax treatment (AFT hereafter) and the Mixed Flat Instrument
treatment (MFI thereafter). The dynamic extraction game is played over 10 periods.

Treatments
Laissez
faire (LF)

Mixed flat instrument
(MFI)

Flat tax (FT)

Group size
(N)
Benefit
function

5

a = 5.3
b = 0.09
p = 7.55
f = 0.01

Cost
function

z=0
S 1 = 500

Account
evolution

r = 30

Available
range
of unit
orders
Policy
instrument
Tax rate &
audit
probability
Individual
penalty
Collective
penalty

Ambient flat tax (AFT)

[0,50]
Laissez
faire (LF)

τ =1

x
x

Mixed flat instrument
(MFI)

Flat tax (FT)

Ω ti

x

p = 0 .2
U (S , y (S )) − p ⋅τ ⋅ y (S )
=
t

t
m

t

t
m

x

τ =1

κ = 0 .2

p = 0 .2

p=0

τ × (yit − yˆ it )

t

p

Ambient flat tax (AFT)

[

Γit = τ × max 0,Y t − Ŷ t

x

]

[

]

Γit = κ × max S t + Y t − S t* ,0

Table 1: Experimental parametric restrictions on the extraction model

In order to reduce the complexity of the decision environment some simplifications have been
introduced. Explicitly, no distinction was made between orders revenues and costs. Subjects
knew only the net outcome of their withdrawal decision. Additionally, the individual penalty
in the FT and MFI treatments was deeply simplified (Table 1). We have replaced in the
penalty function (equation 6), the ith appropriator extractions ( yit ) by the period t optimal

9
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( ( ))

feedback of myopic appropriators ymt S t 7, and the ith appropriator declared extractions ( ŷit )
by zero. In this way the individual penalty in each period reduces to a function of the
available stock, becoming a lump-sum penalty. These simplifications were introduced to ease
the participants’ task, tough it implies a negative expected profit of non compliance.

3.1 Predictions
Figures 1, 2 and 3 plot the extraction path of the myopic, rational and optimum strategies8. In
the LF treatment, the extraction paths are clearly different for each strategy. While the myopic
extraction path is decreasing (large amounts extracted in early periods due to impatient
behaviour) the rational extraction path is quite stable. The strength of the “social dilemma” is
at its maximum in the first periods as the optimum extraction path has a positive slope. Taking
the optimum strategy as an efficiency benchmark9, the myopic and rational strategies achieve,
respectively, 74% and 51.8% of efficiency with respect to the benchmark.
The predictions for the FT and MFI are similar (Figure 2). The optimum prediction is the
same as in the LF treatment (Figure 1). As can be seen, the myopic and rational strategies
extraction paths approach the optimum, although not completely, compared to laissez faire.
But there are large gaps in the first four periods and the last two periods. The rational and
myopic strategies achieve, respectively 89.4% and 76% of gross efficiency. However, the
efficiency net of taxes is smaller, 61.4% and 42.3% respectively. Actually, appropriators
withdraw more than the optimum strategy, and pay the corresponding tax, because the tax rate
is too low and compliance is ensured by the individual and collective penalties.
The strength of the “social dilemma” is smallest in the AFT treatment, as the extraction paths
are closest to the optimum path. As a consequence, the predicted gross efficiency of this
treatment outperforms the FT and MFI treatments. The rational and myopic strategies
achieve, respectively 92% and 81.6%. Conversely, the net efficiency under the AFT is lowest.
The rational strategy achieves 54.4% of net efficiency. The predicted accumulated wealth net
of taxes under the myopic strategy is negative (net efficiency of -20.4%). Again the low tax
rate fails to encourage myopic appropriators to refrain their withdrawals. Rational
appropriators triplicate the myopic performance because they consider the impact of actual
withdrawals on the size of the future collective penalty. Since the target path and the stock
recharge are fixed for the whole temporal horizon, excessive orders in early periods may
cause irreversible deviations from the target path in the future. Then, even if total orders are
equal to zero in a future period, the period target may not be attained and the collective
penalty levied.

3.2 Experimental Implementation
All experimental sessions were conducted at the University of Montpellier 1 using the z-Tree
computer programme (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited from the pool of

7

We assume that the entire population behaves myopically.
Predictions are calculated for each treatment assuming that all appropriators in the population follow the same
strategy, i.e. rational, myopic or optimum strategies.
9
We define efficiency as the wealth that has been accumulated until the end of period T under a particular
strategy with respect to the optimum strategy.
8
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undergraduate students of LEEM10. None of the subjects had ever participated in a similar
experiment. Most recruitment was done by e-mail. Subjects were invited to participate in an
experimental game lasting approximately one and a half hour, and were told that they will
receive a cash payment based on their decisions and the decisions of the group (in addition to
a show-up fee).
16
14
12

Withdrawals

10
8
6
4
Rational
Myopic
Optimum

2
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Period

Figure 1: Predictions of the laissez-faire treatment.

16
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Withdrawals

10
8
6
4
Myopic
Rational
Optimum
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1
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4

5
6
Period

7

8

9

10

Figure 2: Predictions of the FT and MFI treatments.

10

Laboratory of Experimental Economics of Montpellier.
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16
14

Withdrawals

12
10
8
6
4
Myopic
Rational
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10

Period

Figure 3: Predictions of the AFT treatment.

At least two independent groups of 5 subjects participated in each session. Subjects were
assigned to separate boxes on a random basis. Communication was not allowed. At the
beginning of a session, subjects first read individually the paper instructions, which were read
aloud by an assistant after individual reading. Understanding was checked individually by a
questionnaire11. No practice rounds were performed.
In each session, subjects participated in four repetitions of a ten-period dynamic game. We
called this repetitions series 1, 2, 3 and 4. Subjects were given a show-up fee that was
calculated to cover eventual losses. Prior to series 1, subjects were assigned to groups of five
players without being told the identity of the other group members. The composition of
groups remained the same during the whole experimental session. The same treatment
condition was kept during the four series.

3.3 Decision Setting
In each period, subjects choose independently and simultaneously the amount of units to
extract. Individual unit orders were restricted to values in the range12 [0,50] . In every
treatment subjects disposed of two tables. The first table shows the return of various
combinations of the available units in the account and unit orders (in the allowable range).
Since we could not provide a complete table for all possible combinations, subjects were
given a partial table as well as the formulae that were used to calculate the profit. The second
table indicated the target of each period: the targeted stocks for the AFT treatment, and the
individual extractions cut-off levels for the FT and MFI treatments. Moreover, in the FT
treatment an additional table was provided showing the lump-sum penalties. Profits and
penalties were expressed in “experimental points”, and subjects were aware of the conversion
rate of points into Euros.
The size of the group and the profit function were common knowledge. At the beginning of
each period, subjects were informed of their accumulated wealth and of the available units in
11
12

During the questionnaire filling subjects were allowed to ask questions individually to the assistants.
Even if unit orders were not restricted to be integers, all participants have ordered integer amounts.
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the account. After each decision period subjects were informed about their own profits for that
period. A “summary table” of the series was available, with information about previous
periods’ accumulated wealth, net return, unit order, and the available units in the account.

4. Results
We run two sessions by treatment, involving the participation of 15 subjects each, excepting
one session of the MFI treatment where only 10 subjects participated. Data of a total of 23
groups and 92 series (at the group level) were collected.
We call “unconditional benchmarks” the predictions described in figures 1, 2 and 3 because
they rely on the common assumption that each subject behaves as predicted. As current
decisions depend on the actual history of the game which can differ from the predicted path,
new benchmark outcomes (depending on history) must be calculated. We call them
“conditional benchmarks”.
We first analyze the fitting of individual data to the benchmarks. This allows us to
appropriately perform afterwards the assessment of the policy instruments efficiency. Under
non optimal policy instruments, alternative behavioural assumptions (rational, myopic and
optimum) lead to different predictions. To assess correctly the efficiency of a policy the
population type must be known.
Tables 2 to 5 show the mean squared deviation (MSD) of individual data with respect to the
unconditional benchmarks and in brackets the limits of the bootstrap intervals at 95% of
confidence (if the intervals overlap the differences are not significant at the 5% significance
level). The MSD of individual data with respect to the conditional benchmarks are shown on
the right side of each table.

(

MSD = ∑∑ yit, j − yit, j
t

i

)

e 2

(11)

N

Figures 4 to 7 plot the mean withdrawals with their bootstrap intervals at 95% of confidence
and the conditional predictions of the theoretical strategies for each policy treatment
respectively, as well as the mean withdrawals of the laissez faire treatment.

4.1 Comparison of behavioural hypotheses

RESULT 1: In the laissez-faire treatment the myopic strategy is the best fitting strategy.
As can be seen from Table 2, the optimum strategy MSD with respect to the unconditional
benchmark is significantly the largest one. Whilst the unconditional MSD does not allow
distinguishing between the rational and the myopic behaviours, the MSD with respect to the
conditional benchmarks indicates that the myopic strategy is the best fitting one. The
conditional MSD of the myopic strategy is significantly lower than the rational strategy one
(p-value = 0.0656; Friedman test). As shown in Figure 4, the mean extraction path is
significantly lower than the myopic conditional benchmark and significantly higher than the
rational conditional benchmark. Thus, mean extractions seem to back a mixed population of
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myopic and rational agents. However, until period seven the mean extraction path resembles
rather to the myopic benchmark than to the rational one, thereafter we are unable to
distinguish between these strategies. Detailed analysis on individual extractions must to be
performed to clarify this point.
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Figure 4 : Mean withdrawals versus conditional benchmarks for the LF treatment.

LF treatment
Conditional benchmarks

Unconditional benchmarks
Strategy
Mean
[95% intervals]
Series

Rational

Myopic

Optimum

Rational

Myopic

Optimum

1

375.51
[197.16 586.51]

382.91
[200.59 596.89]

1010
[797.93 1265.6]

440.9

381.4

1046.6

2

191.19
[81.02 215.89]

150.65
[82.43 229.62]

744.86
[686.68 807.48]

213.9

181.4

764.9

3

188.89
[62.14 360.24

189.5
[65.84 360.81]

849.5
[690.27 1045.13]

286.2

200.2

894.2

4

65.11
[31.22 119.67]

63.49
[31.08 112.04]

746.11
[668.16 843.21]

154.4

70.8

750.3

Global Mean
[95% intervals]

193.01
[128.67 264.53]

196.64
[134.6 268.85]

837.62
[759.32 926.16]

273.84

208.44

864.01

Table 2: Mean Squared Deviation for the LF treatment.

RESULT 2: In the flat tax treatment any benchmark successfully explains the data.
Inspection of Table 3 reveals that no significant differences exist between the rational and the
myopic strategy as measured by MSD with respect to the unconditional benchmarks. Besides
that the myopic strategy shows the lower MSD with respect to the conditional benchmark, we
cannot conclude that it is the best fitting one. As shown in Figure 5, mean withdrawals are
14
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significantly different compared to the myopic conditional benchmark until period 8. In the
later periods they remain above the rational conditional benchmark, but the difference
between the benchmarks are not sufficient to conclude that the myopic strategy better fits the
data.
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Figure 5 : Mean withdrawals in LF and FT treatments versus FT conditional benchmarks.

FT treatment
Conditional benchmarks

Unconditional benchmarks
Strategy
Mean
[95% intervals]
Series

Rational

Myopic

Optimum

Rational

Myopic

Optimum

1

1164.69
[728.1 1654.7]

997.53
[591.4 1444.5]

1584.27
[1072.5 2167.5]

1442.1

1249.8

1840.6

2

343.64
[245.57 475.09]

226.74
[162.88 317.68]

692.05
[539.78 876.73]

370.7

249.5

708.8

3

288.57
[227.19 362.52]

177.11
[132.67 235.03]

621.97
[513.09 738.56]

310.7

184.6

662.1

4

262.04
[225.69 304.34]

147.74
[122.18 177.31]

589.5
[512.41 672.87]

295.5

173.0

638.4

604.7

464.2

962.5

Global Mean
[95% intervals]

514.73

387.28

871.95

[405.12 645.54]

[285.73 504.38]

[734.5 1032.4]

Table 3: Mean Squared Deviation for the FT treatment.
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RESULT 3: In the ambient flat tax treatment the myopic strategy is the best fitting strategy.
Whilst the MSD with respect to the unconditional benchmarks indicates that the optimum
strategy does not explain mean extractions, we cannot identify the best fitting among the two
remaining strategies with this criterion. Nevertheless, the myopic conditional benchmark is
the best fitting strategy as measured by the MSD with respect to the conditional benchmarks
(p-value = 0.0163; Friedman test). Figure 6 shows that the difference between the myopic
prediction and the mean withdrawals is significant until period 6. Besides, the mean
extractions trajectory seems to follow the myopic trajectory.
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Figure 6 : Mean withdrawals in LF and AFT treatment versus AFT conditional benchmarks.
AFT treatment
Conditional benchmarks

Unconditional benchmarks
Strategy
Mean
[95% intervals]
Series

Rational

Myopic

Optimum

Rational

Myopic

Optimum

1

677.61
[487.23 868.23]

706.34
[516.51 902.13]

1082.6
[894.6 1286.3]

1136.6

870.9

1137.3

2

740.23
[503.07 993.97]

781.89
[536.55 1030.2]

1100.83
[807.31 1435.6]

1066.3

850.3

1095.2

3

476.49
[322.09 708.4]

532.91
[375.88 759.56]

686.06
[485.62 970.24]

666.5

519.6

696.8

4

285.97
[202.2 374.1]

323.20
[232.7 419.88]

655.39
[545.28 780.07]

597.4

378.4

624.0

Global Mean
[95% intervals]

545.07

586.08

881.22

[453.1 642.09]

[493.16 681.26]

[768.24 995.99]

866.7

654.8

888.3

Table 4: Mean Squared Deviation for the AFT treatment.
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RESULT 4: In the mixed flat instrument treatment the myopic and the rational strategies are
equally well fitting the data.
Likewise in the treatments analysed previously, the optimum strategy’s MSD with respect to
the unconditional benchmark is significantly the largest one. However, under MFI neither the
unconditional MSD nor the conditional MSD allows us to point out which strategy, myopic or
rational, better explains the data (p-value = 0.1495; Friedman test). However, figure 7 clearly
shows that mean withdrawals are significantly similar to the myopic benchmark, excepting in
periods where the myopic and the rational conditional predictions overlap, i.e. periods 4, 5
and 6. This may suggests that mean withdrawals are generated by a mix of rational
withdrawers who reacted to the instrument as expected and withdrawers who ignored the
instrument.
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Figure 7 : Mean withdrawals in LF and MFI treatment versus MFI conditional benchmarks.
Treatment MFI
Conditional benchmarks

Unconditional benchmarks
Strategy
Mean
[95% intervals]
Series

Rational

Myopic

Optimum

Rational

Myopic

Optimum

1

520.86
[324.11 729.91]

415.18
[238.15 597.63]

869.29
[640.3 1145.0]

591.3

466.2

962.4

2

604.14
[333.79 903.32]

554.65
[266.57 872.67]

855.09
[602.5 1133.7]

781.3

718.0

1117.8

3

480.25
[253.84 739.61]

387.58
[193.31 615.24]

805.29
[527.6 1135.6]

525.1

431.8

872.0

4

217.82
[170.04 274.75]

195.46
[147.60 246.92]

444.43
[343.34 555.81]

246.8

228.5

519.3

Global Mean
[95% intervals]

455.77
[351.5 579.1]

388.22
[286.75 508.64]

743.53
[626.67 880.84]

536.1

461.1

867.9

Table 5: Mean Squared Deviation for the MFI treatment.
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4.2 Instrument efficiency assessment

RESULT 5: The AFT and MFI policies significantly move extractions towards the optimum
unconditional benchmark with respect to the laissez-faire observed extraction path.
The conditional benchmarks converge to the same extraction level in the last period.
Therefore the incentive instruments must achieve a reduction of extractions in early periods of
the temporal horizon to be effective. The withdrawal trajectory of those instruments that
succeed have a positive slope, and cross the LF mean withdrawals trajectory in the same way
that the myopic prediction crosses the optimum trajectory in Figure 1.
Figure 5 shows that the FT does not achieve a significant shift of the extraction trajectory
towards the optimum. Although the trajectories cross each other the differences are not
significant except in period 9. Additionally, the MSD of the optimum strategy under the flat
tax (Table 3) does not show any significant reduction with respect to the LF treatment (Table
2). From Figure 7 it can be seen that the MFI accomplishes a significant move towards the
optimum unconditional benchmark; the trajectories clearly cross each other. However, this is
not supported by the comparison of the MSD of the optimum strategy with the LF treatment.
The AFT achieves the most important extraction reduction in early periods (Figure 6), but
extractions remain stable over the horizon.
Cheating could be an explanation for the poor performance of the FT instrument in moving
the extraction trajectory toward the optimum. Under AFT cheating is irrelevant since there are
not withdrawals declarations, and in the MFI the group fraud is always detected, though it is
not always individually punished. However, in the FT the random audit the agents may
underestimate the expected penalty and be encouraged to cheat.

RESULT 6: In the FT treatment, cheating explains the deviations with respect to the myopic
conditional benchmark.
In order to support result 6, let us define a new extraction path generated by a population
containing a mix of “cheaters” and compliant agents. In a given period we assume that a
cheating agent declares zero extraction, but withdraws from the account as if the tax rate was
null. On the other hand, a compliant agent behaves according to the myopic conditional
prediction. The mix changes over time since a compliant agent might become a cheater, while
a cheater might become compliant. Expression (12) describes the extraction path generated by
the mixed population. We call it “X prediction” thereafter. Note that if the population is fully
compliant the “X prediction” overlaps with the myopic conditional benchmark.

(

) (

) (

y xt = γ t ⋅ ymt S t ,τ t + 1 − γ t ⋅ ymt S t ,0

(

)

(12)

)

Where γ t is the compliance rate in period t, ymt S t ,τ t is the myopic conditional benchmark
given the stock S and the tax rate τ , and y (S ,0 ) is the myopic conditional benchmark of
the laissez faire situation.
t

t

t
m

t
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Figure 8 plots the mean extractions, the myopic conditional benchmark, and the “X
prediction” defined above. As can be seen the “X prediction” fits quite well the mean
extractions in the FT. It does not differ significantly from the mean extractions except in the
first series of groups 1, 5 and 6.

RESULT 7: The contrast between the FT and the MFI policies reveals that the collective
penalty achieves higher compliance than the lump-sum penalty.
Figure 9 reports the mean compliance rates, defined as the ratio of the declared to the real
extractions, and the bootstrap intervals at 95% of confidence for the FT and MFI for each
period. Significant differences are observed for periods 1, 4, 6, 7, 9 and 10.Thus, results 5, 6
and 7 suggest that compliance is a crucial determinant of the effectiveness of a policy
instrument.
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Figure 8 : Mean extractions, myopic conditional benchmark and X Prediction by group and series for the
FT treatment.
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Figure 9 : Mean compliance rate and 95% confidence bootstrap intervals for FT and MFI treatments.

As a general result the tested policies were unsuccessful. The MSD with respect to the
optimum unconditional benchmark remains very high in every policy treatment and takes
similar values to those of the LF treatment. Besides, their effectiveness can be assessed and
compared.
We perform comparisons of instruments by using an effectiveness indicator. Deviations of the
observed extractions with respect to the optimum trajectory cannot be directly used as a
measure of effectiveness because conditional predictions differ depending on the evolution of
the stock. Therefore, we normalize the deviation by the conditional prediction of the “strength
of the social dilemma” (SSD), which is measured as the absolute value of the difference
between the optimum unconditional prediction (the target trajectory) and the myopic/rational
conditional predictions. The larger the SSD the higher will be the weight in terms of
effectiveness of each unit of differential reduction. The indicator of ineffectiveness is given
by:

( ) 

Myopic SSD

 y t* − ymt S t

∑∑
 yit − y t*
t
i


Rational SSD

 y −y S

∑∑
 yit − y t*
t
i

t*

t
r




( ) 

N ⋅T
(13)

t




N ⋅T

Where yit , ymt , yrt , y t* are respectively, the observed extractions of subject i, the myopic and
rational conditional benchmarks, and the optimum unconditional benchmark.
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RESULT 8: Under the assumption of myopic behaviour for all players, the most effective
instruments are the MFI and the FT.
On the basis of the effectiveness indicator for a myopic population, we reject the null
hypothesis that all samples are drawn from the same distribution13 (p-value 0.000; Friedman
test). The effectiveness mean indicator of the mixed flat instrument is equal to 0.1642, which
is significantly higher than the effectiveness mean indicator of the ambient flat tax, equal to
0.0647 (p-value = 0.000; Friedman test). No significant difference exist with the flat tax, the
effectiveness indicator being equal to 0.1523 (p-value = 0.4233; Friedman test). Additionally,
the AFT is significantly less effective than the FT (p-value = 0.000; Friedman test).
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Figure 10 : Policy effectiveness comparisons; myopic population.

In order to avoid excessive inference errors, we carry out a multi-comparison test based on
Tukey's honestly significant difference criterion14. Panel (a) of Figure 8 shows that the mean
rank of the AFT is significantly smaller than for MFI (5% significance level), but there is no
significant difference between AFT and FT. However at the 10% significance level we found
the result of the individual comparisons described in the previous paragraph (panel (b) of
13

For the MFI we have only 5 independent groups. Since the Friedman test requires balanced samples we
duplicated randomly one group of the MFI treatment. In this case samples contain 24 observations: 4 series per
group and 6 groups in each treatment.
14
The test was implemented by the multcompare function of the Matlab 6.5 Statistical toolbox.
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Figure 5). Both panels of Figure 8 also show that FT is less effective than MFI. This is backed
by the MSD observation that the MFI policy is closer to the optimum than the FT policy
(Tables 5 and 3, respectively).
Result 8 contrasts sharply with result 5. This is due to the predicted differences in the strength
of the social dilemma (SSD) that modifies the weighting of the deviations in the effectiveness
indicator (equation 13). For example, in the case of a myopic population the SSD is given by
the difference between the myopic conditional benchmark and the optimum unconditional
benchmark. From figures 6 and 7 it can be seen that in period 1 the SSD under FT and MFI is
twice the SSD of AFT. Consequently, under the assumption of a rational population, the
policy effectiveness comparison may provide different results because the SSD predicted
values for each policy differs compared to the myopic population case.

RESULT 9: Under the assumption of rational behaviour for all players, all policies are
equally effective.
As for the case of a myopic population, we reject the null hypothesis that all samples are
drawn from the same distribution (p-value = 0.0731; Friedman test). The effectiveness mean
indicator of the MFI is equal to 0.1634 and is significantly higher than the effectiveness mean
indicator of the AFT, which is equal to 0.1271 (p-value = 0.0306; Friedman test). The flat tax
effectiveness mean indicator is equal to 0.1508 and does not show a significant difference
with the MFI indicator (p-value = 0.5218; Friedman test) nor with the AFT indicator (p-value
= 0.1093; Friedman test).
In contrast to the myopic case, the AFT effectiveness indicator is much higher here. The
multi-comparison test does not show any significant difference in the effectiveness mean
indicator (Figure 9). Thus, the results of the individual comparisons are not supported
preventing us to point out the most effective policy.
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Figure 11 : Policy effectiveness comparisons; rational population.

This divergence highlights the importance of the behavioural rules which characterise the
target population for the design and evaluation of incentive policy instruments. Our
instruments are not individual-specific since they are uniformly applied to the entire
population. Our results clearly show that the predicted efficiency differs sharply depending on
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the population type. Thus, the evaluation of an incentive policy performance may result in
opposite conclusions depending on what we expect from an instrument.

RESULT 10: The flat tax is the most efficient policy and the ambient flat tax is the less
efficient, in gross and net terms.
Table 6 shows the efficiency of each treatment. Gross efficiency is measured as the ratio of
the accumulated wealth at the end of the game and the optimum strategy wealth
(unconditional prediction). The net efficiency is measured in the same way that the gross
efficiency but the tax and penalty payments are deduced from the accumulated wealth.
On the basis of gross efficiency FT is close to the LF. Combined to result 2, it seems that the
FT instrument was completely ignored by the subjects. But result 8 does not support this
conclusion. Paradoxically, the instruments that were most successful to curb the extraction
path towards the optimum path, the MFI and the AFT as stated in result 5, are the less
efficient ones. In our dynamic game stock saving implies forgone earnings that must be
“cashed” in future periods by extracting the optimal quantities, otherwise losses become
significant. This is likely to have happened under the AFT and MFI instruments. Figures 6
and 7 show that the resource stock was respectively under and over exploited in the final
periods with respect to predictions. Thus, care must be paid in implementing time inconsistent
instruments, since early deviations from predictions alter the incentives set by each policy,
either encouraging non optimal behaviour or just confusing subjects with distorted signals.
Anyhow, deeper analysis on individual decisions must be performed to assess more accurately
the impact of time inconsistency.
All policy instruments performed quite badly in terms of net efficiency (Table 6). The large
differences in the net efficiency just indicate the strength of audit and penalty systems to
assure compliance.

LF
Treatments
-

FT

Gross efficiency
(Net efficiency)

MFI

AFT

Global

Myopic

mean

prediction

47.82%

51.8%

41.71%

79.2%

(3.25%)

(62.79%)

30.76%

79.2%

(-27.1%)

(62.79%)

20.88%

81.6%

(-99.52%)

(-20.4%)

Table 6 : Gross and net mean efficiency.

5. Conclusion
In this paper we tested experimentally three alternative non optimal policies to cope with
dynamic externalities. We considered policies designed for managing the exploitation of a
renewable common-pool resource when the time horizon is finite and individual withdrawals
are unobservable by the regulator.
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In a dynamic framework, policy parameters must change from one period to the other to adapt
to the resource state and to the remaining time. In order to correctly internalize the
externalities, the tax rate, the penalties, and the targets need to be adjusted to the new state of
the resource. Because the practical implementation of such flexible policies is generally
unfeasible, because of technical and ethical constraints, we considered that the regulator is
restricted to implement ‘fixed’ non optimal instruments, i.e. policy parameters remain fixed
all along the temporal horizon. While fix instruments are time inconsistent, they still may be
able to implement the first best extraction path.
We compared three alternative non optimal instruments: (i) a fix rate tax on declared
extractions with a compliance monitoring mechanism (flat tax, FT treatment), (ii) an ambient
tax with fixed tax rates and targets (ambient flat tax, AFT treatment), and (iii) a mixed
instrument (mixed flat instrument, MFI treatment) combining the two previous instruments.
All three instruments share the particularity that if extractions are lower or equal to an
exogenous target, the tax rate is null. While the targets are set at the individual level for FT
and MFI, they are set at the group level for AFT. FT and MFI differ with respect to the
compliance monitoring mechanism. Under FT random auditing is implemented to detect
cheaters who must pay their tax debt and a lump-sum penalty. Under MFI a collective penalty
is levied if total declared extractions differ from the total extraction observed by the regulator.
Random controls are implemented to track for cheating appropriators who must pay their tax
debt and the collective penalty while the compliant appropriators are freed of paying the
collective penalty.
The AFT and MFI succeed in moving significantly the mean extraction path towards the
optimum path, compared to the laissez faire mean trajectory. On the contrary, the FT
instruments had no impact on subjects’ decisions, since the rate of compliance is very low
under this instrument. Actually, the collective penalty under the MFI achieved higher
compliance than random audit with lump-sum penalty implemented in the FT. Anyhow
compliance achieved by the collective penalty remains under the prediction (no cheating).
Additionally, we compared the instruments’ effectiveness in approaching the optimum
trajectory, on the basis of an indicator that takes into account the “strength of the social
dilemma” (SSD). Roughly speaking, the SSD indicator corrects the difference between the
observed trajectory with the instrument and the target trajectory by a measure of distance
between the predicted trajectory with the instrument and the target trajectory. Two distinct
comparisons were performed, corresponding respectively to a myopic behavioural hypothesis
and to a rational behavioural hypothesis. No significant difference in effectiveness between
instruments was found under the rational behavioural hypothesis. However, under myopic
behaviour, AFT is the least effective instrument, in sharp contrast with the evidence exposed
previously. This conclusion is attributable to the predicted differences in the strength of the
social dilemma (SSD) that affects the weighting of the deviations in the effectiveness
indicator. The divergence highlights the importance of the behavioural rule which
characterises the target population for the design and evaluation of incentive policy
instruments. Our results clearly show that the predicted efficiency is strongly affected by the
behavioural assumption about the relevant population of players. We conclude that the
expected performance of an instrument is strongly dependent on the agents’ behaviour.
From a practical point of view, our results suggest that the implementation of time
inconsistent policy-instruments must be made very cautiously. We found that that the most
successful instruments for shifting the extraction path towards the optimum path (i.e. MFI and
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AFT) are the less efficient ones. In the dynamic game we have tested, a stock saving implies
forgone earnings that must be “cashed” in future periods by extracting the optimal quantities,
otherwise losses will become significantly high. A policy that does not give enough incentives
to cash the fruits of previous savings will be inefficient. Consequently, our results strongly
suggest that the design and implementation of time inconsistent instruments demand great
vigilance as early deviations from predictions alter the incentives introduced by each policy,
encouraging thereby non optimal behaviour or just confusing agents with distorted signals.

6. References
Basar, T., G. J. Olsder (1999), “Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory”, Philadelphia,
SIAM.
Baumol W.J., Oates W.E. (1988), “The theory of environmental policy”, Second Edition,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Becker, G. S. (1968), “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, Journal of Political
Economy 76, 169-217.
Brozovic, N., Sunding D.,Zilberman D. (2006), “Optimal management of groundwater in
space and time”, in Goetz R.U. and Berga D. (eds), Frontiers in Water Resource Economics,
New York NY, Springer, 109-135.
Clark, C. (1974), “The Economics of Overexploitation”, Science, 181(4100), 630.
Efron, B., Hordan R., Jolivet E., Yahi N., Saporta G. (2001), « Le bootstrap et ses
applications » CISIA-CERESTA Editions.
Fischbacher, U. (2007), “z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments”,
Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171-178.
Giordana, G.A. (2007), « L’efficacité des instruments économiques pour réguler les
prélèvements diffus dans un aquifère côtier menacé par l’intrusion d’eau de mer »,
Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Université de Montpellier 1.
Herr, A., Gardner R., Walker J. (1997), “An Experimental Study of Time-Independent and
Time-Dependent Externalities in the Commons”, Games and Economic Behavior 19(1), 7796.
Ko, I.D., Lapan H.E. Sandler T. (1992), “Controlling Stock Externalities: Flexible versus
Inflexible Pigouvian Corrections”, European Economic Review, 36(6), 1263-76.
Kritikos, A.S. (2004), “A penalty system to enforce policy measures under incomplete
information”, International Review of Law and Economics, 24(3), 385-403.
Levhari, D., Michener R. and Mirman L.J. (1981), “Dynamic Programming Models of
Fishing: Competition”, American Economic Review, 71(4), 649-61.

25
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper133

26

Giordana and Willinger: Fixed Instruments to Cope with Stock Externalities An Experi

Levhari, D. Mirman L.J. (1980), “The great fish war: an example using a dynamic CournotNash solution”, Bell Journal of Economics, 11(3),322-334.
Millock K., Sunding D., Zilberman D. (2002), “Regulating Pollution with Endogenous
Monitoring”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 44(2),221-241.
Pollinsky, A.M. Shavell, S. (1979), “The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and
Magnitude of Fines”, American Economic Review, 69(5), 880-892.
Provencher, B. Burt O. (1993), “The Externalities Associated with the Common Property
Exploitation of Groundwater”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24(2),
139-158.
Reinganum, J. Stokey N. (1985), “Oligopoly extraction of a common property natural
resource: the importance of the period of commitment in dynamic games”, International
Economic Review 26(1), 161-173.
Segerson, K. (1988), “Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control”, Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 15(1), 87-98.
Xepapadeas, A. (1991), “Advanced Principles in Environmental Policy”, Cheltenham UK,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
Xepapadeas, A. (1992), “Environmental Policy Design and Dynamic Nonpoint-Source
Pollution”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 23(1), 22-39.
Xepapadeas, A. (1994), “Controlling Environmental Externalities: Observability and Optimal
Policy Rules”, in C. Dosi and T. Tomasi (eds), Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation: Issues
and Analysis, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 67-86.

Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Mabel Tidball, Marielle Montginoul and Bertrand Aunay for their
stimulating discussions and valuable comments as well as the participants of the SysCoLag
seminars. We acknowledge the Languedoc-Roussillon Region and IFREMER for financial
support.

Appendix: Equilibrium Derivation
In this appendix we show how the Rational, the Myopic and the Optimum outcomes are
derived.
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Rational outcome
The optimisation horizon is finite and known with certainty. Each appropriator calculates a
feedback strategy, supposing that there are N-1 other appropriators behave in the same
manner (Equation A2.4). Each solves the program:

max
Vi t ( y t , S t )
t
yi

s.t.

yt ≥ 0

i = 1,..., N

Program (A)

St − Y t ≥ 0
Where,
y t = ( y1t ,..., yit ,..., ynt ) ,
Vi t ( y t , S t ) = EU it ( y t , S t ) +

T

∑ρ

s = t +1

s −t

⋅ EU i*s ( yr*s , S s )

i = 1,..., N

ρ ∈ (0,1) is the discount rate, and yrs* (S s ) is the optimal feedback for period s resulting from
the solution of the equation system constituted of the program (A)’s N F.O.C. in period s.

( )

[

(

y t S t = C t ⋅ At ⋅ E t + l ⋅ r ⋅ G t + F t

)]

A.1

Where,
l = f +φ ,

At = a − P + l ⋅ S t ,

A.1.1

 1
 1
, CT = 1 D , ET = 1 ,
Et = 1 +  t − D 
C
l
⋅
n



A.1.2

D = 2b + (n + 1) z ,

A.1.3
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Myopic outcome

In the myopic behaviour case, the optimization horizon is just one period. Supposing that
everybody behaves myopically, the myopic appropriator calculates a period’s profit
maximizing extraction taking the rules of his rivals as given:

(

max
EU y t , S t
t
yi

)

yt ≥ 0

s.t.

i = 1,..., N

Program (B)

St − Y t ≥ 0

Each period withdrawals are represented by a function of the available stock that is invariant

( )

with time, yi S t

∀i , resulting from the solution of the equation system constituted of the

program (B)’s N F.O.C.:

( )

ymt S t =

a − p + l ⋅ S t At
=
2b + (n + 1) z D

∀t

A.2

Note that the myopic optimal feedback is similar to the period T rational optimal feedback.
Equation A.2 can be obtained from equations A.1 for null discount rate, ρ = 0 .

Optimum outcome

In each period t, withdrawers behaves like a benevolent regulator, they maximise the sum of
the joint profit from t until T:

T

N

max
∑∑ Vi*t ( y t , S t )
t
y

s.t.

t =1 i =1

yt ≥ 0

Program (C)

St − Y t ≥ 0
where,

y t = ( y 1t ,..., y it ,..., y nt ) ,
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Vi*t ( y t , S t ) = EU it ( y t , S t ) +

T

∑ρ

s −t

s =t +1

⋅ EU i*s ( y *s , S s )

i = 1,..., N

ρ ∈ [0,1) is the discount rate, and
y *t = arg max

( y1t ,..., yit ,..., ynt )

T

N

∑∑ V
s =t i =1

i

*s

( y s* , S s )

Like in the rational outcome, each period extractions are, yi*t , are a function of the available
stock and time (equations A.1). It is just needed to replace equations A.1.4 by A.3.7, A.1.6 by
A.3.9, and A.1.3 par :
D = 2b + 2nz

A.3.1
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